

## CHAPTER X

THE DEFENCE OF ANHOLT: PART TAKEN BY THE ROYAL MARINE ARTILLERY. LIEUTENANT ANDERSON, R.M.A., ON BOARD THE "SAFE-GUARD." INCREASE OF ESTABLISHMENT. HEIGHT LIMIT FOR MORTAR SERVICE. BLUE UNIFORM AUTHORIZED FOR OFFICERS. NEW MORTAR RANGE AND R.M.A. DRILL-GROUND AT CHATHAM. R.M.A. DETACHMENTS FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN, BALTIC, AND NORTH SEA FLAGSHIPS.

1811

THE Romantic Defence of Anholt " was what the Prime Minister, Mr. Spencer Perceval, in Parliament, called the defence of that island by its Marine garrison on March 27th 1811, on the news reaching England of the defeat of the Danish expeditionary force which had attempted its recapture. Anholt, a small island in the Kattegat situated midway between Denmark and Sweden, had been held by us ever since May 1809, when it was seized, primarily in consequence of its importance as a lighthouse station for the safe passage of shipping proceeding to and from the Baltic. Its position rendered the occupation of the island further desirable as promising a convenient entrepôt, or distributing centre, for the ports of Northern Europe, closed to British trade since 1806 by Napoleon's Berlin decree.

A Marine garrison had been kept at Anholt practically ever since its capture, it being anticipated that the Danes would endeavour to regain the island, as indeed they had declared their intention of doing. The island itself was a flat, barren, treeless stretch of sand-hills, six miles from end to end, and surrounded by reefs and shoals. It lay in the very centre of the Kattegat, forty miles from the Danish shore on one side and the same distance from the Swedish shore on the other. The island trended from west-south-west to east-north-east; its greatest width being three miles across at the southern end. Thence it narrowed gradually and terminated at the northern end in an elongated spit, or tongue, of low shore, and sand-dunes of slight elevation. The lighthouse was situated on the northern side of Anholt, about a mile from the extreme east point of the island.

The constant patrolling of the adjacent waters by British frigates and

gunboats from the Baltic Fleet prevented any Danish attack on Anholt being made in 1810. It was then planned at Copenhagen to make an attempt to recover the island in the early spring of 1811, immediately on the winter ice breaking up and crossing to the island becoming practicable; before the British Baltic Fleet, usually due in April, could reach its station. The middle of March was tentatively fixed for the attack.

The garrison of Anholt in March 1811 comprised three hundred and fifty infantry marines under Captain (Acting Major) Torrens, R.M., and thirty-one R.M.A., under First-Lieut. Richard C. Steele and Second-Lieut. John Bezant. Lieutenant Steele also did duty as A.D.C. to the Governor. Captain J. W. Maurice, R.N., celebrated for his fine defence of Diamond Rock, Martinique, six years before, was the Governor of Anholt in 1811. A small schooner, called *H.M.S. Anholt*, commanded by Lieutenant H. Loraine Baker, R.N., with twenty-five men, was attached to the garrison for off-shore duty.

The defences of the island consisted of a palisaded enclosure within which were an octagonal battery, built round the lighthouse, called Fort Yorke,\* mounting two 24-prs. and four 18-prs., a work built on a sandbag platform, to give command of fire on the south side and west over the outer parapet, known as the Massareene Battery, armed with four 24-prs. and four 18-prs., and a battery of one 13-inch and two 10-inch mortars, fronting south-east. Four 5½-inch carronades were fixed to fire from windows in the lighthouse. An isolated 18-pdr. on a platform was mounted four miles off on South Hill, a hundred feet high, the highest ground on Anholt, overlooking and enfilading the beach near the south-west end of the island, where there was a wide strip of flat shore on which landing was easy. The garrison were ordinarily quartered in buildings within the palisaded enclosure between Fort Yorke and the Massareene Battery, where also were the officers' quarters and mess, and the R.M.A. gun-sheds and stables. From the moment of receiving the first warning in February everything possible was done towards strengthening the defences of the island, and pickets watched all round, day and night.

The first intelligence of the intended attack reached Anholt on February 7th 1811, when a Swedish brig engaged in the Baltic contraband traffic brought news that a Danish force of about twelve hundred soldiers was assembling in Jutland for a descent on the island before long. Another trader confirmed the news three days later. Then, on March 14th—nothing having happened meanwhile—a letter from Gothenburg in Sweden gave definite information as to the date of the attack and the force to be employed.

\* So named after the Hon. Charles Yorke, First Lord of the Admiralty. The name Fort Yorke, given to the lighthouse octagon battery, was also used generally of the whole place.


Twenty Danish gunboats with armed luggers and other craft, together with transports carrying two thousand soldiers and a naval brigade, were, it was stated, under orders to assemble in Gjerrild Bay in Jutland (rather more than forty miles from Anholt to the south-west), on March 23rd, and start immediately afterwards.

After finally ascertaining the approximate strength of the garrison through a spy, a Danish naval officer who landed on March 23rd under a flag of truce, ostensibly to make an inquiry on a private matter, the Danish gunboats and transports started from Gjerrild Bay after dark on the evening of March 26th. The transports were escorted by eighteen large gunboats and several armed small vessels.

They set out in two divisions, the first of which reached Anholt at 4 a.m. on March 27th and at once landed the naval brigade of Danish men-of-warships and about two hundred soldiers. The second division was following some way astern. The wind was from the west, favourable for a rapid crossing to the island. The landing on Anholt took place on the open beach at the south-west end of the island, in a dense fog.

The first alarm was given to the garrison by the firing of the picket posted near the single 18-pr. above the south beach. The picket there then sent word to Fort Yorke and fell back as the Danish numbers on the beach increased. Immediately all at Fort Yorke and thereabouts turned out and stood to arms and manned the works. As the reports brought by messengers from the picket were not consistent, from inability to see things clearly owing to the fog and dark early morning, Captain Maurice decided to make a reconnaissance at once, with two companies of infantry marines and the R.M.A. with four howitzers all horsed. Captain Torrens commanded the two companies; First-Lieutenant Steele was in command of the howitzer brigade; Lieutenant Bezant remained in charge of the Massareene Battery. What R.M.A. gunners could be spared from accompanying the howitzers meanwhile took post, with infantry marines, at the guns in the light-house fort and the battery.

The force moved out through the fog and darkness of the morning for the south-west side of the island, a distance of some four miles from Fort Yorke. It halted as daylight was coming on and the fog clearing a little, at the foot of a ridge of sand-hills at a short distance from and overlooking the beach, where the enemy were reported to have landed. First-Lieutenant Steele then rode ahead to South Hill, in order to reconnoitre and choose a place for his guns. He quickly discovered that the enemy were in greater strength than had been reported, and that they were already advancing in two formed bodies. One set of Danes was coming on directly for the sand-hills; others, "in a heavy column in close order," was marching



THE ISLAND OF ANHOLT.  
1811.



along the beach, as though intending to work round towards the eastern end of Anholt. Some way off, about three miles away, the second Danish flotilla was seen nearing the island. These looked, as Lieutenant Steele described in an account he wrote afterwards, like "a little wood of masts flanked by heavy gunboats." Captain Maurice's force was in immediate danger of being outflanked by the Danes moving towards the east, and at the same time the Danes coming on in front already outnumbered them. Lieutenant Steele rode back and reported, whereupon orders were at once given to withdraw and get back to Fort Yorke.

As the British retired the foremost Danes topped the sand-hills and began firing on them. One party of Danes made for the single 18-pr. on South Hill, and on reaching it hoisted Danish Colours on a signal mast, near by, and began to clear the gun for action and slew it round to fire on the British as they fell back. The withdrawal was conducted in perfect order and Fort Yorke was safely reached; although several times during the four miles' retreat it appeared that the headmost of the enemy would be able to close on them. More than once, as Captain Maurice described, they came within fifty yards. These were the Danish seamen of the naval brigade, about two hundred in number. They were boldly led by an officer, who came near enough to us to be recognized as the naval lieutenant who had visited Anholt three days before under the flag of truce. The Danish seamen, described Lieutenant Steele, were "advancing with rapidity and cheering the retreat of the howitzers."

As Captain Maurice's force reached Fort Yorke and thus left a clear field of fire, the marines there and in the Massareene Battery and those manning the Lighthouse Battery opened on the enemy with musketry and grape. The firing at once checked the Danish advance, and the enemy turned aside from pursuing and ran into two "large houses," as they are described, near by, on the western side of the island towards the beach. The gunners in Fort Yorke and Massareene Battery, reinforced quickly by some of the R.M.A. men who had brought in the howitzers, joined in the firing and before long forced the Danes out of the houses. The enemy after that re-formed into a column of attack among the nearest sand-hills. At the same time the Danish gunboats, which had been hitherto moving up along the coast on the north side of the island, so as to reach a position opposite the lighthouse and Fort Yorke on its sea side, were nearing their stations for action.

On the opposite side of the island the second column of Danish soldiers, whom Lieutenant Steele had seen marching by the beach towards the eastern end of Anholt, had meanwhile not yet been engaged. They had by now however turned in, and crossing east of the lighthouse, had reached

their intended position. The second flotilla of Danes had anchored and were about to land its body of troops on the south beach, where the first force had landed.

The Danes had now taken up their positions for battle everywhere. On our side all was ready. The British, if their numbers were few in comparison with the enemy, were in fortified works with sufficient guns and were full of confidence in themselves. From the top of the lighthouse, 112 feet high, there was a complete command of view all round.

The main attack on Fort Yorke and the Massareene Battery, where Lieutenant Bezant and his R.M.A. gunners were, opened about seven o'clock. The Danes attacked simultaneously from both the eastern and the western sides. Each enemy column of attack was about six hundred strong—making up between them a force three times the strength in numbers of the defenders. The Danes all began swarming forward across the open, with the intention of carrying the British works at a rush. As they began their advance the Danish gunboats—eight or ten of them were at that point—opened fire on the Lighthouse Battery. The Danes of the western attack after their first repulse, fell back and then came on again, dragging forward with them a light field-piece, one of four that they had got ashore. With this the enemy now fired on the British. The Danish attacks in their second onset specially concentrated on the Massareene Battery side and the front between the lighthouse and the mortar battery, but at no point could they pass the palisades or break through the defence.

Lieutenant Steele's description of his men's work and what took place during the first two hours of the action—particularly referring to the eastern Danish attack—is as follows: "The Marine Artillery—and there was one [man] stationed at each gun the moment the field-pieces [the howitzers] returned to the redoubt—pointed so exactly at the interstices [the gaps in the line of sand-hills] through which the enemy endeavoured to rush our works that no forlorn hope could go to more certain death; and while they rallied behind these natural approaches, our men waited before them, with the match lit and the muzzle of their guns levelled at the breaks through which they [the Danes] so bravely tried to come at us." Lieutenant Steele adds this of the western attack: "The column on the south [west] side brought up a field-piece and made repeated efforts, which were as repeatedly frustrated by our destructive fire."


There was a short lull in the general attack towards nine o'clock, after the combined rushes from both sides had failed to carry the British position. During the temporary pause the western force of Danes were reinforced by some of the troops landed by the second flotilla, all of whom were by now on shore. The greater part of these, however, were held back as a reserve

and halted near the ridge of sand-hills a short way in rear of the western attacking force.

A few minutes before ten o'clock the enemy made their second attack in force, again simultaneously charging forward from opposite sides, east and west, and with the energy of desperation. The Danes, as Lieutenant Steele describes, now charged through the sand-hill gaps to "within pistol shot on both sides" [forty yards] to rush the defenders in a general assault, but, as Steele puts it, "our guns and musketry absolutely mowed them down. Their leaders were shot down, while the destructive fire of the batteries strewn the plain with killed and wounded."

While the second Danish attack in force was taking place, aid came to the defenders from the side of the sea. First of all, just as this attack was beginning to open, a party of infantry marines, who had previously been on picket duty at North Hill and whose retirement had been cut off by the earlier advance of the enemy, managed to rejoin. They comprised part of the light company under Lieutenant Holtaway. Unable to get through to Fort Yorke overland, Holtaway and his men made for a small fishing hamlet on the coast, seized a boat, and daringly working their way round, firing now and again at Danish troops near the beach, landed close by Fort Yorke and amidst the cheers of their comrades, made their way inside the Lighthouse Battery. Then, a little time later, the *Anholt* schooner, with Lieutenant Baker, R.N., and another party of the R.M. light company, under Lieutenant Turnbull, came on the scene. They had been away for the previous three days, having, as Captain Maurice described, "gone on the daring adventure of destroying the enemy's flotilla in its own port," before the Danes started. The *Anholt* schooner bore down along the north and east end of the island and ran in close to the beach flanking the sand-hills opposite where, just at that moment, the eastern force of Danes had recoiled to after once again being beaten back. In their last rush the Danes had lost their commanding officer, a major, the leader of the expedition and others of their foremost officers. A panic set in as the schooner began firing on them and enfilading their position with her four 4-prs. and musketry from Turnbull's party of marines. The eastern column on that raised a flag of truce and offered to surrender on terms. Captain Maurice refused to parley. He demanded instant and unconditional surrender; and without further effort the Danes on that side gave in and laid down their arms.

Lieutenant Baker, in his report to Admiral Saumarez, his Commander-in-Chief, speaks thus of his impression as he arrived. "As we rounded the reef the noble and incessant fire kept up by the English batteries left no doubt of the result of the affair in my mind."



# FORT YORKE, ANHOLT.

*From a M.S. official plan drawn in 1812 for Admiral Sir James Saumarez,  
 Commander-in-Chief, Baltic Fleet.*

1811.



The flank attack by the schooner was one deciding factor. There was yet another.

The attacking Danish gunboats had deserted their comrades on shore, and had gone off a short time before the *Anholt* closed in. A British frigate, the *Tartar*, 32 guns, had made her appearance, coming towards the gunboats, whereupon they cut their cables and made off. Unknown to the Danes, the *Tartar* had reached the island, with the 16-gun sloop-of-war *Sheldrake*, at dusk on the evening of the 26th, and anchored north of Anholt. The mist over the sea shrouded everything in the earlier part of the following morning and nothing of either British ship was for some time visible to the Danes. The two, as it happened, had been sent by Admiral Saumarez from England on the admiral receiving a letter from Captain Maurice, written in February, that an attack was preparing. A gunbrig with two 8-inch mortars and a R.M.A. detachment on board, the *Safeguard*, and the *Wrangler*, another gunbrig, had also been despatched from England, but had not yet arrived. On learning of the landing of the Danes, Captain Maurice sent instructions to the *Tartar* to attack as soon as possible on the western side of the island. The *Sheldrake* he instructed to keep watch off the eastern end. The *Tartar*, under a heavy press of sail, beat up in the indicated direction, but with the wind as it was and the intricate and far-extending shoals, she was forced to work round the Knoben shoal, which threw her out of her course for ten or twelve miles, with the result that it was some hours—after the crisis of the fight had been passed—before she could take her part against the enemy.

The Danes of the western attack soon saw what had happened with their comrades, and they, also seeing the gunboats making off, in their turn showed a flag of truce. On that, Captain Robert Steele\* of the infantry marines, acting as Garrison Adjutant, went out, accompanied by a sergeant of the Marine Artillery as interpreter (the latter speaking Danish), to meet the flag-bearer, who came forward together with three officers. The spokesman of the three attempted to bluff at first, but on Captain Steele treating it as "a piece of insolence" and turning to walk away, the Danes changed their tone. "The next moment," says Lieutenant R. C. Steele in his narrative, "the Danes, holding up white handkerchiefs, called that they would lay down their arms and leave the island. They were told that the only terms were unconditional surrender. On that the three Danish officers took off their swords and handed them over."

There still remained intact the Danish reserve force in rear, a large body of soldiers, apparently two battalions. After hesitating for a brief space,

\* There were two Steeles at Anholt: Captain Robert Steele of the Infantry and First-Lieutenant Richard Charles Steele of the Artillery.

these, on finally realizing the situation, began to move back towards the south beach, which, as has been said, was about four miles off. Captain Maurice, as yet unaware of the strength of the enemy reserve, decided to follow them, as soon as he had shepherded in the surrendered Danes and placed them in safe custody. The prisoners, or the greater part of them, were collected and hustled into the palisaded enclosure and shut up inside the R.M.A. stables, where the artillery brigade horses had been kept. "The prisoners," says Lieutenant Steele's account, "were hastily secured in the stables and a gun was pointed at the door with a sentry and a couple of marine artillerymen with lighted matches. The prisoners were told that they would be fired on if they attempted to break out." That seen to, Captain Maurice moved off with the four R.M.A. howitzers, under Lieutenant R. C. Steele, horsed as before, and with forty infantry marines of the light company under Lieutenant Holtaway; all that Captain Maurice thought it advisable to take with him in consequence of the large number of prisoners—over 500 unwounded officers and men—on his hands. Captain Torrens, the Commandant R.M., although wounded, accompanied Captain Maurice.

Following in the track of the Danish reserve, Captain Maurice reached the sand-hill ridge overlooking the south beach—near the place from which in the early morning Lieutenant Steele of the Royal Marine Artillery had reconnoitred. He saw the beach below crowded with Danes, beginning to embark on the transports, which were covered by the remainder of the gunboats, lying close in and prepared for action. With his small party it was hopeless for Captain Maurice to attack, a strong rear-guard force of Danes being formed also to prevent interference. The British could only stand and watch the enemy going on board. They waited until all the transports and gunboats there were under way, after which they returned to Fort Yorke.

In the *finale* of the affair, the *Tartar* chased the bulk of the transports and their escort, eight gunboats, which headed for the Jutland coast. These were the nearest enemy to her. She managed to overtake and capture two of the transports before being forced to haul off by shoal water near the Danish shore. Four gunboats and one transport, which had made off towards the Swedish coast, were chased by the *Sheldrake*. Two of the four were captured, and one gunboat was sunk.


The prisoners numbered five hundred and twenty unwounded officers and men; and the spoil included one field gun, two 4-inch mortars, and a considerable quantity of shells and ammunition, muskets and bayonets. Not more than twenty-three wounded Danes were picked up on the field, all of them seriously wounded; a number of wounded had been carried to

the reserve column during the lull in the main attacks and taken on board the transports. In like manner, many of the dead Danes had been previously removed. Between thirty and forty dead Danes were found in the open. On the British side, thanks to the cover of the entrenchments, the casualties were only two killed and thirty wounded.

"The greater number of the Danish wounded," says Lieutenant Steele in his narrative, were suffering from cannon-shot wounds, with injured limbs necessitating amputations. The Officers' Mess was turned into a hospital, "and the next morning as I was passing the door at the usual breakfast hour there stood two wheelbarrows full of arms and legs which were sent off to be buried at low-water mark."

Captain Maurice, in his despatch to the Admiralty on the defence of Anholt, said this of the Royal Marine Artillery officers: "Lieutenant R. C. Steele claims my warmest acknowledgements for the arrangements he made, which enabled us to keep up so heavy and destructive a fire." "Lieutenant J. Bezant deserves every commendation I can give him for his cool and able judgment in the direction of the guns in the Massareene Battery." The officers of the infantry marines were all individually named as, by Captain Maurice, deserving of "my warmest acknowledgements," Lieutenants Holtaway and Turnbull\* of the light company being also commended for their "great zeal and energy." The Admiralty promoted Lieutenant Baker, R.N., of the *Anholt* schooner, to Commander, and awarded brevets to Captain Robert Torrens and to the senior subaltern of the infantry marines, Lieutenant and Acting Quarter-Master J. N. Fischer. No other officers of the marines at Anholt, either infantry or artillery, received any recognition of their services from the Admiralty. When, on May 13th, Brevet-Major Torrens requested permission of the Admiralty for the officers who had taken part in the defence of the island to wear "as a memorial" on the breastplates of their shoulder-belts the word "ANHOLT"—a species of honorary distinction which had been granted by the Horse Guards to certain line regiments, both cavalry and infantry, for special service on various occasions—the Admiralty reply was "while highly appreciating

\* The picture of "The Defeat of the Danes in the Attack on Anholt, March 27th, 1811," reproduced here, was sketched on the spot and painted by Lieutenant Turnbull. It was published as a coloured engraving, and was widely popular for several years. Certain details in the representation do not, it should be said, correspond with the contemporary accounts of the engagement. It apparently shows the situation just after the *Anholt* schooner had come into action. The western Danish attacking force is that in the foreground, not yet aware of what had befallen the Danes attacking on the opposite side, and would seem to be making its final attempt to close on the British works. Lieutenant Turnbull, R.M., was appointed to the R.M.A. in March 1817. He had served with the Artillery in an acting appointment on board one of the bombs at the attack on Algiers in August 1816. He died in 1824, as the result of illness contracted by exposure to inclement weather during the Algiers Expedition.



ANHOLT—THE DEFEAT OF THE DANES.

27th March 1811.

*From a Contemporary Drawing by Lieut. R. Turnbull, R.M.*



their zeal, gallantry and good conduct, my Lords cannot sanction any memorial or designation of the kind proposed."

Wrote Admiral Saumarez to Captain Maurice on receipt of the Anholt despatch:

"I most heartily congratulate you on the brilliant success of the brave garrison under your command in having repulsed an attack of the enemy's selected troops, consisting of as many thousands as the whole force opposed to them amounted in hundreds, and on the gallantry and intrepid conduct of your valiant heroes who succeeded in taking a greater number of prisoners than their own collective force. I can only assure you that this gallant affair is the theme of everyone's praise and has excited the admiration of all."

When the Naval General Service Medal, for actions between 1793 and 1840, was granted and issued in 1848 to "all Officers, Petty Officers, Seamen and Marines, present in any action, naval or military," within the period, Anholt survivors apparently numbered only forty-two, and "Anholt" clasps to that number only were issued. Four clasps were issued to the Royal Marine Artillery: one each to Lieutenant Bezant, Corporal S. Weeks, and Gunners J. Penferry and D. Jones. (Illustrations facing page 1004.)

Lieutenant Bezant's medal with two clasps, one for "Basque Roads 1809" and one for "Anholt," was sold in London in July 1918, at Messrs. Glendinning's sale of the Medals and Decorations in the celebrated collection owned by Dr. A. A. Payne of Sheffield. Lieutenant Bezant's medal with the Basque Roads and Anholt clasps was added to the collection in the Officers' Mess at Eastney in 1927. There seems to have been at first, in 1847, some demur at the Admiralty in regard to allowing the defence of Anholt to count as a *naval* action and thus being qualified for a Naval General Service Medal clasp. The difficulty was got over through the fact that not only was the island commanded by a post-captain, Captain J. W. Maurice, R.N., but that the island had been temporarily rated as a sloop-of-war, and the marines, both artillery and infantry, borne on the books of a man-of-war in commission, the *Raisable*. There was also another difficulty raised. According to the Admiralty rule at that period, the Medal could only be granted for an action "noticed as a battle of conspicuous merit by the promotion of the First Lieutenant of the ship, or the promotion of the Commander, if the action was fought by a small vessel." Captain Maurice was not promoted; but received the official thanks of his Commander-in-Chief. The fact, however, that the lieutenant in charge of the schooner *Anholt*, the tender to the garrison, Lieutenant T. Loraine Baker, had been promoted to commander for his part in the

action, enabled the Admiralty Committee finally to surmount the second obstacle.

In February 1812, Governor Maurice again received information from Gothenburg that another attack on Anholt by the Danes was in preparation. The Admiralty were informed and seven gun-brigs were sent from England to assist in the defence, together with a hundred infantry marines and ten R.M.A. gunners under Lieutenant W. H. Devon. The expected attack however did not take place, and eventually the Danish troops collected for the expedition were drafted off to join one of the army corps starting for Napoleon's Russian campaign.

The Royal Marines continued to garrison Anholt down to August 1812, when the infantry and half the gunners in the island were withdrawn, on relief by the 11th Royal Veteran Battalion from England, a formation comprised of able-bodied old soldiers and Chelsea pensioners. Lieutenant Bezant however, with a small party of the R.M.A. detachment, continued at Anholt for nearly a year afterwards, until the summer of 1813. Then, on the batteries being dismantled, they also left to rejoin Headquarters at Chatham.

Four ships, it has been said earlier in the account of the defence of Anholt, were sent off from England in February by Admiral Saumarez, on being informed by Captain Maurice that an attack on the island was impending. Two, the *Tartar*, frigate, and the *Sheldrake*, sloop, arrived, as it has been told, in time to take a part in intercepting the retreating Danish flotilla. The two others, the *Safeguard* and the *Wrangler*, the former carrying two 8-inch mortars and with on board a detachment of Royal Marine Artillery, reached Anholt a day or two afterwards. The Royal Marine Artillery detachment in the *Safeguard*, 1 sergeant, 1 corporal, and 8 gunners, under First-Lieutenant David Anderson, came in, two months later, for an action with Danish gunboats, the fight being carried through in somewhat exceptional conditions. The *Safeguard*, a 12-gun brig-of-war, during May and June was kept on the station to cruise between Anholt and Jutland, chasing French privateers, or waylaying Danish vessels passing up and down the coast, and occasionally shelling Danish batteries and camps on the mainland. On June 29th, while on that duty, the gun-brig was attacked by four Danish gunboats carrying 24-pr. guns. The *Safeguard* lay becalmed and the Danes came down on her with sweeps. The gun-brig, as it happened, was very short-handed that day. Only twenty-nine men, including the marine artillery detachment, were on board. The rest, forty-four seamen and the lieutenant, the only commissioned naval officer on board except the captain, had been sent away in prizes recently taken. The enemy were held back by the *Safeguard's* fire for a time, and

then drew off nearly beyond range. After that they began cheering and all four gunboats came on again. The captain of the *Safeguard* had gone below, and Lieutenant Anderson took charge on his own initiative. "Anticipating their intention to close and board," says Lieutenant Anderson in his official statement of what took place, sent in to Admiral Saumarez as Commander-in-Chief of the Baltic Fleet, "and not having seen the Commander on the quarter-deck for some considerable time, I ceased firing to allow them to close. I addressed the ship's company, renewed the action and repelled a formidable attempt to board. Continued action for one and a half hours longer until the commander came on the quarter-deck and said 'Nothing more can be done for the Brig.' I answered, 'If we are to fight, I will do so whilst there is a timber above water to stand on.' The Colours were hauled down. On that," continues the report, "a cry was heard 'Fight the brig, Mr. Anderson, and we will go to the bottom with you.'" The action, as stated, lasted three and a half hours in all, going on for nearly two hours after Lieutenant Anderson had the Colours re-hoisted. After that, with nineteen men out of the twenty-nine on board killed or wounded, crippled aloft, and with between five and six feet of water in the hold, the well-defended *Safeguard* was obliged to surrender. The brig was taken possession of by the Danes, and towed into Randers Bay on the coast of Jutland, not far from which the action had taken place. Lieutenant Anderson was given parole, and continued in Denmark until the following November, when he was exchanged for a Danish officer, taken in the battle of Anholt, and returned to England. Lieutenant Anderson, for his part in the engagement, received the thanks of Admiral Saumarez. He remained a lieutenant, however, in spite of that and subsequent distinguished service elsewhere during the war, until 1826.\*

At Chatham, throughout the year 1811, Brevet-Major Minto continued in command at headquarters of the four Royal Marine Artillery companies as before. Demands that were made on him from time to time by the Admiralty for embarkations of detachments gave a good deal of anxiety in regard to finding the men. The companies, from various causes, were considerably under strength, particularly as to thoroughly trained men. And at the same time Major Minto set his face against sending out gunners whom he considered not completely efficient and fully trained. The deficiency of men at Chatham, qualified for sending out in response to Admiralty demands, led in the autumn of 1811 to the authorization of an increase in

\* Lieutenant David Anderson, later on, by deed poll, took the additional name of Gibsone. He died in 1861 as Major-General David Anderson Gibsone. The captain of the *Safeguard* was able to account for himself satisfactorily and he was a few months later given the command of another gun-brig, the *Flamer*, in which during 1812, again in the Baltic, he rendered notable service in two engagements.